Fire Department Incident Safety Officer or The Logic of Political Survival

Fire Department Incident Safety Officer

Author: David W Dodson

The best way to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths at incidents is the appointment of a well-prepared proactive Incident Safety Officer(ISO). This book primes aspiring and current Safety Officers to meet and exceed the specific job functions outlined in the 2007 Edition of NFPA 1521: Standard for Fire Department Safety Officer, as well as to aggressively pursue the operation of a highly efficient safety program. Extensively revised, the second edition of Fire Department Incident Safety Officer incorporates topics specifically focused on further developing and improving existing safety programs. Fundamental coverage of job functions for successful handling of incidents involving hazardous materials, technical rescue, wildland fire, and other disasters is accompanied by explanations of the critical skills required to be a proficient Safety Officer, including the processes of reading smoke, anticipating risk, predicting building collapse, and improving firefighter rehabilitation.

See also: State of War or Man the State and War

The Logic of Political Survival

Author: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita

CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title for 2004 and Winner of the 2004 Best Book Award presented by the Conflict Processes section of the American Political Science Association (APSA)

The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not.

The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.

Table of Contents:

	Preface
I	A Theory of Political Incentives	1
1	Reigning in the Prince	3
2	The Theory: Definitions and Intuition	37
3	A Model of the Selectorate Theory	77
II	Policy Choice and Political Survival	127
4	Institutions for Kleptocracy or Growth	129
5	Institutions, Peace, and Prosperity	173
6	War, Peace, and Coalition Size	215
7	Political Survival	273
III	Choosing Institutions	327
8	Institutional Preferences: Change from Within	329
9	The Enemy Outside and Within: War and Changes of Leaders and Regimes	405
10	Promoting Peace and Prosperity	461
	Notes	487
	References	503
	Index	519